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Abstract 
 
Regulators play a critical role in the commercial exploitation of new technologies.   They protect the public when 
market competition might persuade companies to take undue risks.   At the same time, it is essential that regulatory 
authorities do not kill innovation by imposing inappropriate rules or by retaining previous requirements that make 
little sense in the light of technical innovations.   These tensions are apparent in the introduction of autonomous and 
semi-autonomous systems, across a range of industries.  ‘Regulatory lag’ has starved companies of the strategic 
guidance that is necessary to make informed decisions about acceptable levels of safety and security for the 
integration of these technologies.   This paper argues that existing product-based, process-based and performance-
based approaches to regulation threaten the safe and secure exploitation of new markets.  In contrast, we advocate a 
Competent, Anticipatory, Self-Reflective approach, which places performance requirements on the regulator rather 
than on the markets they protect. 
 
Introduction 
 
The United States National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) (Ref.3) identifies a spectrum of 
autonomy: 
 
• Level 0: The driver completely controls the vehicle at all times; 
 
• Level 1: Individual vehicle controls are automated, such as electronic stability control or automatic braking; 
 
• Level 2: At least two controls can be automated in unison, such as adaptive cruise control in combination 
with lane keeping; 
 
• Level 3: The driver can fully cede control of all safety-critical functions in certain conditions. The car 
senses when conditions require the driver to retake control and provides a "sufficiently comfortable 
transition time" for the driver to do so. The Tesla Model S provides an example of this level of automation; 
 
• Level 4: The vehicle performs all safety-critical functions for the entire trip, with the driver not expected to 
control the vehicle at any time. As this vehicle would control all functions from start to stop, including all 
parking functions, it could include unoccupied cars.  Google’s Self-Driving Car Project illustrates full 
autonomy (Ref.1).  These lack the physical controls that might otherwise support direct human control. 
 
In aviation, the FAA has introduced similar distinctions in their Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and subsequent 
requirements for the Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (RIN 2120–AJ60).   A 
Remotely Piloted Airborne System (RPAS) may operate under the direct control of a ground-based pilot equivalent 
to NHTSA levels 1 and 2.   It may also operate under automated control for specific operations providing that the 
pilot retains ‘line of sight’ with the vehicle; equivalent to levels 3 and 4.   However, full autonomy is not permitted 
without specific waivers, for example ensuring that operation is restricted to carefully controlled, experimental 
contexts well away from controlled airspace.   Other industries are also exploring acceptable levels of autonomy in 
safety-related applications from the autonomous monitoring of ‘Smart’ power distribution grids (Ref.4) through to 
robotic surgical systems (Ref.5). 
 
New generations of autonomous systems create significant concerns for public safety.  In particular, it is unclear 
how to integrate these applications with more conventional systems under direct human control (Ref.6).   For 
example, the testing of automated vehicle technologies is only possible in the UK if a test driver is present and takes 
responsibility for the safe operation of the vehicle and for the safety of other road users.  There are further concerns: 
 
  
• Maintaining situation awareness.   It is hard for human operators to monitor semiautonomous systems, 
when little direct intervention is required.   Boredom and inattention can lead to significant safety concerns.  
Even in fully autonomous systems, it is important for operators to respond to degraded modes of operation 
– for instance alerting other airspace users to potential problems with RPAS (Ref.7); 
 
• Supporting manual intervention.  Over time, manual control skills can be eroded so that even when 
operators maintain adequate situation awareness, they lack the necessary skills to assume control of a 
semiautonomous system.  Bainbridge provides an eloquent review of the ‘Ironies of Automation’ – the 
more successful automation becomes then the less prepared operators that will be to respond to failure 
modes (Ref.8); 
 
• Maintaining cyber security. It is important that operators and engineers identify potential vulnerabilities 
and mitigate threats to the cyber security of autonomous and semiautonomous systems (Ref.9).  The lack of 
direct manual control increases the possibility that attackers will disrupt or redirect the operation of these 
platforms and their associated communications links; 
 
• Lack of appropriate historic data.   In conventional applications, companies can draw on a wealth of 
experience to guide key decisions in the design and operation of complex systems.  Unfortunately, the 
novelty of autonomous systems means that we have relatively little expertise in appropriate means of 
integration with conventional systems (Ref.10).   In particular, it is very unclear how best to organize the 
interactions that might arise between multiple autonomous and multiple conventional systems. 
 
This is not an exhaustive list of the concerns that arise from the introduction of autonomous systems across many 
different industries.  In the face of such uncertainty, commercial organizations must identify acceptable levels of 
safety and security when seeking to exploit new market opportunities.  This raises further questions; can the public 
place an appropriate level of trust in the safeguards provided by companies competing to develop new markets 
without some form of independent guidance?   There is also a concern that commercial pressures will influence the 
subjective interpretation of ‘acceptable’ levels of risk.  
 
Why Regulate Autonomous Systems? 
 
Governments can exploit a number of mechanisms to increase public confidence and at the same time promote the 
development of autonomous and semiautonomous systems (Ref.11). 
 
Limits of Market Forces: Market forces reduce the need for regulation in the design and operation of autonomous 
systems.  If companies fail to ensure the safety and security of the general public then customers will not continue to 
buy their products.   This ignores the limitations of ‘imperfect information’.   In other words, customers may be 
unaware of the high accident and incident rate associated with existing systems.  Even when they are aware of the 
risks, safety information can be obscured by coverage of individual success stories.   These concerns have been 
identified in studies of military RPAS; many nations have sustained significant financial and operational losses as 
they rush to exploit new capabilities (Ref.12). 
 
Third party effects also limit the use of market forces to ensure safety and security.  These arise when the victims of 
an accident are not involved in the demand or supply of autonomous systems, for example, bystanders at a sporting 
event that is being filmed using an RPAS.   In such circumstances, market forces will not limit the supply of 
potentially dangerous products because the operators do not perceive the risks they create for the general public.   It 
is for this reason that the FAA requires the registration of lightweight drones.  This enables legal redress against the 
individuals and companies that endanger safety. 
 
Limits on Insurance and Tort: Tort law helps to mitigate third party effects; injured parties can sue the operators and 
manufacturers of autonomous systems.  Financial costs and punitive damages can be awarded after an incident. 
Unfortunately, Tort is retrospective.  Litigation takes place after an accident has occurred. Some US states now 
require a surety bond of $5 million for the operation of autonomous vehicles (Ref.16).  However, the manufacturers 
and operators of autonomous systems can be persuaded to offset the costs of litigation and surety by purchasing 
insurance (Ref.13).   Insurance can have a proactive effect when actuaries reduce premiums for operators and 
manufacturers that demonstrate strong security/safety cultures.   
  
 
Litigation and insurance do not provide a panacea.   In particular, it is often hard for underwriters to calculate 
appropriate premiums when they cannot easily assess their future exposure based on past risks.  The consequent cost 
of any policy may kill the development of a fledgling industry, especially is all potential users are compelled to 
carry such insurance. 
 
Concerns for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems 
 
Given the concerns over the unhindered use of market forces and of litigation to support the safe development of 
autonomous and semiautonomous systems, governments have accepted the need for regulation (Ref.14).   However, 
there is huge uncertainty over appropriate forms of intervention with inconsistent approaches being adopted both 
across and within industries around the globe. 
 
Inconsistency: It is hard to exaggerate the diversity of approaches to the regulation of autonomous systems.   The 
rules are different from one country to the next.  This is illustrated by Table 1, which contrasts the different 
requirements for RPAS operation across North America.   These differences arose even when the two countries tried 
to reflect the requirements of their neighbor.  The classes of airspace mentioned here are derived from the 
International Civil Aviation Organization – for example, air traffic management does not control class G operations 
and any clearances are advisory.  In contrast, class E air space is controlled for aircraft operating under instrumented 
flight (IFR) but uncontrolled if using visual flight rules (VFR).  Further details are provided in the ICAO Annex 11.   
 
PROVISION CANADA USA SMALL UAS USA MICRO UAS 
Definition  < 4.4 lbs (2 kg) < 55 lbs (25 kg)  < 4.4 lbs (2 kg) 
Maximum Altitude  300 ft 500 ft 400 ft 
Airspace Limits Class G only Class G and E. Class B, C, D with ATC permission Class G only 
Distance From 
Obstacles 
100 feet laterally from structures, 
100 feet from people 
Operation prohibited over any person 
not involved in operation 
Flying over any 
person is permitted 
Operational Area 
Extension No Yes, from a boat No 
Autonomous 
Operations No Yes No 
Aeronautical 
Knowledge Required Ground school Knowledge test Self-certification 
FPV Permitted No Yes, if you can also visually see UAS No 
Operator Training Ground school Not required Not required 
Visual Observer 
Training Ground school Not required Not required 
Operator Certificate Not required Required, must pass basic UAS aeronautical test 
Required, no 
knowledge test 
Preflight Safety Check Required Required Required 
NearAirport 
Operations No Yes No 
Congested Area 
Operations No Yes Yes 
Liability Insurance Required, $100,000 No No 
Daylight Only Yes Yes Yes 
Aircraft Made of 
Frangible Materials No No Yes 
 
Table 1: Comparison of US and Canadian RPAS Requirements1 
 
Regulatory guidance on autonomous vehicles in Europe and in North America also varies between individual 
regions within the national legal systems (Ref.15).  In the USA, individual state laws vary significantly and “no state 
has fully determined how existing traffic laws should apply to automated vehicles” (Ref.16).   Four states have 
explicit provisions supporting the introduction of this technology.  Fifteen have rejected bills related to automated 
driving even though the US Department of Transport and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) remain committed to supporting the introduction of these technologies. 
                                                            1	http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/drones/faaproposedcommercialdronerules	
  
 
Similar inconsistency can also be seen within Europe.   For example, the Germany Federal Highway Research 
Institute has argued that fully automated vehicles do not comply with existing traffic law. Each Federal state can 
grant exemptions from the German Road Traffic Licensing Regulations to allow tests ‘provided there is a driver in 
the driver’s seat who has full legal responsibility for the safe operation of the vehicle’ (Ref.16).  In France, specific 
zones have been established for testing, including changes to driver training. There is also provision to allow ‘large-
scale’ testing of self-driving cars and trucks.  Sweden has followed a similar approach, allowing tests as part of the 
Volvo ‘Drive Me’ project in restricted areas around Gothenburg.   
 
These differences arise partly from the novelty of these systems and the lack of international agreements about 
acceptable parameters for the safety and security of these applications.   They also stem from international 
competition as countries seek to ensure that their industries are not left behind in the race to develop new 
technologies.   However, regulatory inconsistency has a profound impact especially on international companies who 
must conform to the local requirements that create barriers to the development of a global market place. 
 
Regulatory Competence: The fiscal crisis has prevented many government agencies from hiring and retaining staff 
with expertise in emerging technologies.  Limits on promotion and salary caps can persuade the best engineers to 
leave government service and join ventures developing autonomous systems.  In such circumstances, it is hard for 
regulators to go beyond generic guidance and provide sustained, technical support for the companies developing 
autonomous applications.   This is entirely appropriate when commercial organizations are concerned to protect 
intellectual property rights in a dynamic market place.  However, the limits of regulatory competence create 
significant concerns for the future.  This can be illustrated by existing confusion over the introduction of Artificial 
Intelligence and Machine Learning within safety-critical, autonomous systems.   Existing standards, including 
IEC61508 and ISO26262, exclude the use of such technologies at higher levels of integrity because it is difficult to 
prove that they will not ‘learn’ potentially dangerous behaviors.  
 
The Vienna Convention on Road Traffic requires that ‘every moving vehicle or combination of vehicles shall have a 
driver’ and that ‘every driver shall at all times, be able to control his vehicle’ (Ref.16). Some have taken this to be a 
barrier to the introduction of automated vehicles. However, recent announcements by the NHTSA legal counsel 
imply that the machine learning systems embedded within autonomous vehicles could be considered as a driver 
under federal law (Ref.17), leading the way to the use of AI techniques as a primary means of control on the public 
highway.   We argue that such contradictions between the legal and technical arguments, further demonstrate the 
need for fresh thinking in the field of safety regulation. 
 
Regulatory Lag: In 2012, the United States Congress mandated the FAA to issue specific guidance on the 
regulations governing the introduction of RPAS into the national airspace.   The intention was to provide a 
comprehensive framework that would replace the ad hoc exemptions that supported the commercial operation of 
drones on a casebycase basis.   However, the anticipated deadlines were missed so that by 2015 more than 1,000 
companies had been issued FAA333 exemptions.  This delay can be justified – for example by arguing that the use 
of waivers enables the FAA to gain sufficient operational expertise to inform the subsequent development of 
regulatory requirements.  In contrast, the UK government has advocated a Code of Practice to promote safety and 
set clear guidance in the use of autonomous vehicles. It is argued that a Code of Practice “will be quicker to 
establish, more flexible and less onerous for those wishing to engage in testing than the regulatory approach being 
followed in other countries, notably in the US.  Failure to follow guidance in a Code of Practice would be a clear 
indicator of negligence… Those wishing to conduct tests are not limited to the test track or certain geographical 
areas, and do not need to obtain certificates or permits” (Ref.16).  The Code of Practice would be subject to frequent 
revision without the delays associated with legislative changes or with the formal consultations associated with 
existing regulatory practice.   However, this flexibility carries considerable uncertainty when companies must ensure 
compliance with successive changes in the underlying provisions in these documents. 
 
These examples drawn from autonomous and semiautonomous systems are symptomatic of wider concerns over 
‘regulatory lag’.   In particular, many industries continue to complain about the lack of detailed cyber-security 
guidance even though regulatory agencies clearly acknowledge the growing threat to those companies and to the 
public (Ref.18).     Regulatory lag creates significant problems for government, for industry and for the general 
public: 
 
  
• Elevated Risk.   Without specific guidance, there is a danger that companies, which have not adopted 
appropriate mitigation techniques when deploying autonomous systems, may place the public at increased 
risk.   
 
• Barriers to Innovation.   Without specific regulatory guidance, companies can be dissuaded from entering a 
market with the danger that their products and services may fail to meet subsequent requirements. 
 
 
• Technological Flight.  Without specific regulatory guidance, there is a danger that companies will choose to 
move to other jurisdictions where there is greater certainty in the requirements that they must meet before 
being allowed to operate. 
 
• Legal uncertainty.   Without specific guidance, companies cannot easily assess whether or not they would 
be liable from any litigation following an adverse event. 
 
Many of the causes of regulatory lag have been introduced in previous sections.  They include the difficulty in 
retaining technical competence, concerns over premature regulation, political pressure to stay out of emerging 
markets etc.  However, there are more systematic causes that arguably stem from outdated regulatory practices 
dating back to an era when there was a far slower pace of technical innovation and when there were few truly global 
markets (Ref.11).   
 
New Approaches to the Regulation of Autonomous Systems 
 
The delays in providing regulatory guidance for integrating autonomous and conventional systems and the 
contradictions between technical standards, such IEC61508, and existing commercial practice are symptomatic of 
deeper problems in the regulation of complex, sociotechnical systems.  In particular, there is an urgent need to move 
beyond product, process and performance based regulation to devise ways of protecting the safety and security of 
the public at a pace that at least approximates to the speed of recent technological innovation. 
 
Product vs Process vs Performance Based Regulation: In order to set any new proposals in context, it is important 
first to sketch the three predominant approaches to safety regulation.  Product based techniques specify standards 
against which one can measure particular artifacts.   For example, EN ISO 20346:2004 provides means of 
determining whether or not a shoe provides sufficient protection for use in safety-related industries.   A specific item 
of footwear can be inspected to determine whether it incudes an appropriate steel toecap.   
 
Unfortunately, this product-based approach works less well for more complex systems.  In particular, it cannot 
easily be applied to the logical abstractions within software.  Standards such as DO178C and ISO26262, therefore, 
focus less on artifacts and more on the processes that are used – for example to identify requirements or to allocate 
validation and verification resources.  This maximizes regulatory resources because auditors do not need to consider 
millions of lines of source code. Instead, they can focus on assessing the quality of the higher level processes that 
contributed to the development of that code. 
 
The limitations of process-based regulation include the need for regulators to understand the techniques that are used 
within complex application domains.   It can be hard for regulators who are not practitioners to remain up to date 
with leading software development practices.  There are other concerns, for instance when regulators are too closely 
associated with the companies that they regulate.  It is for this reason that many countries now employ multimodal 
regulators.   These are not specialists in any one domain.  Instead, it is argued that regulators should develop 
expertise in regulation that can be applied across multiple industries.   
 
The deployment of multimodal regulators often supports performance-based regulation.  Rather than focusing on the 
properties of a particular product, or on the processes that were used to develop that product, the focus is on 
monitoring Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for products and processes.   It is important to avoid retrospective 
KPI’s, where we can only identify concerns after an accident has occurred.  Performance based regulation focuses 
on leading indicators that identify potential risks before an accident occurs.   As we have seen, however, it is far 
from clear how to apply performance based regulation to innovative and dynamic industries where we have little 
track record of integration – for instance, between autonomous and conventional systems.   It is hard to identify 
  
appropriate KPIs and the erosion of detailed technical competence associated with multimodal regulation has 
arguably compounded concerns over regulatory lag. 
 
Competent, Anticipatory, Self-Reflective (CAS) Regulation: A range of techniques has been used to combat the 
problems of regulatory lag.   The FAA has issued waivers that permit the violation of existing legislation over the 
years that have been required to iteratively refine regulatory guidance in consultation with dozens of stakeholder 
organizations.  The ad hoc nature of this approach has triggered sustained criticism from industry and from 
politicians.   In contrast, the UK government have advocated the use of less formal Codes of Practice.  These can be 
incrementally refined but lack legal force; violations may or may not be viewed as negligent during subsequent 
litigation.  Companies also face significant risks when complying with Codes that are frequently revised. 
 
In contrast, we would advocate a fresh approach to the regulation of complex and dynamic industries based are three 
guiding principles: 
 
1. Competent Regulation.  The integration of autonomous and conventional systems has revealed the 
pressing need for technical competency.  This might seem self-evident.   However, many countries 
now use multi-modal agencies where staff are not drawn from the industry they regulate.  This 
increases independence because regulators do not work with previous employers.  Their competence is 
in the application of regulatory requirements rather than in their detailed knowledge of domain-
dependent systems engineering.  Multi-modal regulation creates particular concerns for new markets; 
where safety relies on technical innovation.  For example, the NHTSA’s argument that autonomous 
systems can fulfill the safety requirements normally associated with a human driver has enormous 
technical implications for the application of existing standards such as ISO26262 and IEC61508.  We 
urgently need regulators who understand these implications and can provide companies with guidance 
on how to ensure that AI and machine learning techniques are acceptably safe; 
 
2. Anticipatory Regulation.   Again it might seem self-evident that regulators should try to stay ‘ahead of 
the curve’.  However, the delays in integrating autonomous and conventional systems shows that this is 
not always achieved.  Regulatory lag arguably occurs because civil servants habitually seek comfort in 
lengthy consultation processes. This is justified given the strong political disincentives for market 
intervention. However, regulators often fail to catch up when safety concerns arise.  Many agencies 
struggle to enforce acceptable modes of operation after the public has purchased thousands of mass-
market drones.  In contrast, we would argue that future regulation should be anticipatory based on 
proactive market leadership. t is often argued that safety and security have to be designed-in from early 
in the development cycle.  It is, therefore, little surprise that regulatory support is often ineffective 
when drafted months and years after the deployment of complex, autonomous systems; 
 
3. Self-Reflective Regulation.  Our emphasis on technical competence and anticipatory regulation will 
only be successful if regulators learn from their own successes and failures.  Many regulatory agencies 
are deliberately excluded from commissioning this research; from questioning their own practices.  In 
contrast, we would stress the need for regulatory self-reflection.  There is little systematic evidence to 
show that existing standards, such as ED-153 or DO-178C, lead to safety improvements.   Self-
reflective regulation extends the concepts of anticipation and participation to develop an evidence-
based approach to the validation of regularity intervention.  Brevity prevents a detailed analysis of the 
methodologies that might support such studies, however, NASA provide a template; comparing the 
work of multiple contractors using DO-178A to implement the same functional requirements.  The aim 
of this early work was to determine the level of support provided through the use of DO-178 in the 
software development process (Ref. 11).   The UK Health and Safety Executive provide a further 
example when they question the causes of accidents involving systems that were developed under IEC 
61508 (Ref. 12).  At the heart of this work is the idea that the analysis of accidents, which will always 
be possible even under the best regulatory regime, can also be used to improve standards and other 
forms of government intervention.   Both of these research projects were completed in the early 1990s 
but perhaps it is time to resurrect these studies and understand the reasons why new industries are 
faced with regulatory lag in the exploitation of future markets. 
 
 
  
Conclusions 
 
We have argued that ‘regulatory lag’ starves companies of the strategic guidance that is necessary to make informed 
decisions about acceptable levels of safety and security in autonomous and semiautonomous systems.  Existing 
approaches to product-based regulation cannot easily be applied to software intensive systems.   Process based 
techniques often require careful involvement in commercial development practices that cannot be sustained when 
regulators lack technical competence in particular domains.   Performance based regulation fails when it may take 
years before we can identify appropriate leading indicators that anticipate potential accidents. In the meantime, the 
ad hoc use of waivers and the drafting of temporary codes of practice provide companies with few guarantees that 
their investments will meet subsequent regulations.   
 
In contrast, we have stressed the need for Competent, Anticipatory, Self-Reflective (CAS) approaches.   Technical 
competency is required because we do not believe multimodal regulation is capable of providing the detailed 
guidance that is required, for example to ensure that AI and machine learning algorithms provide acceptable 
alternatives to human intervention.  Anticipatory regulation is required because it is increasingly difficult to ensure 
that companies and the general public meet more stringent operating requirements after they have become use to 
semi or unregulated environments.   Finally, Self-reflective regulation extends the concepts of anticipation and 
participation to develop an evidence-based approach to the validation of regularity intervention.  Many regulatory 
agencies are deliberately excluded from commissioning this research; from questioning their own practices.   
 
Further work is required to analyze the causes and mitigations for regulatory lag across a range of different 
industries beyond the specific focus of this paper on autonomous systems.  Some initial studies have been published 
(Ref.14, 15).  However, work in this area remains controversial given the sensitivity of the topic and difficulty of 
identifying appropriate methods for validating alternative approaches to regulatory intervention.   It is clear, 
however, that while many previous papers in ISSC focus on specific tools and techniques for improving safety and 
security, only a very small number consider the regulatory frameworks that help to determine the application of 
those approaches within specific industries. 
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